Gary Mckinnon Extradition To US Blocked By UK Home Secretary | Techdirt
I was planning on making a quick comment on the Gary McKinnon case but the Techdirt article linked is one of the few I’ve seen actually making most of the valid points about this whole mess so deserved a special mention.
The question here is not whether McKinnon is criminally culpable for his actions (that can be established later), but whether it’s right to send him to a country he’s never been to stand trial when he already falls within the jurisdiction of UK courts and is obviously suffering health issues. I made a more flippant point previously on the questions of jurisdiction in these types of cases and, assuming the act is a crime in the place where a person is physically located it’s best left to be handled in that country. To do otherwise means we can end in a situation where a crime can be simultaneously committed in multiple territories (think of accessing data from cloud based services), or for someone to not know where they have committed a crime, or even if their actions are illegal in that location. That’s no way for the law to work. Extradition is a perfectly valid process in cases where a person has left the prosecuting jurisdiction and certainly has a place in the world; just not here.
I hope that, whatever the truth here, justice prevails and I believe that this is a good step towards making that happen. It also seems that we have a chance of doing something about the one-side extradition process we have with the USA.
As an aside I was forced to draw parallels with recent extradition cases (Abu Hamza et al) and reconcile differing views. I think there are some valid points in discussion but ultimately we look at questions of citizenship and the nation’s duty of care to those people; more importantly in those cases it is a fact that no trial could ever happen here in the UK; extradition was required for any real criminal proceedings.
Who cares where your data is? – Roger’s Security Blog – Site Home – TechNet Blogs
There are many issues with data security as soon as we start discussing the “cloud”. Handing control of your data to third parties is pretty obviously something that should take more thought than it does. One area that people forget is to think about the data itself – who owns and controls the email addresses of your customers? The moment it’s on salesforce (to pick an example), they have that data – very few people encrypt the data they give to their service providers; the data and the service are somehow conflated.
Roger picks out a great point which brought back to me my favourite argument against cloud services. At a basic level, the cloud does not exist – what does exist are servers and drives containing data. At any time you, as a “cloud” customer have no idea where your data resides – is it in the USA (the country that searches laptops that come across the border), is it in China, is it in Libya? Only the “cloud” provider may know this. This may seem like a superficial point, but something very serious lies beneath in that different countries retain their own controls over what is acceptable. Whilst we in the UK and Europe think that online gambling is fine, it’s not in the USA – what if a “cloud” provider puts data relating such activities into the USA?
Just to drive home the point – “cloud” customers also have no idea whom else’s data resides on the same hardware as their own. If a criminal or terrorist organisation (in a particular country; obviously definitions vary wildly) happens to share the same services as you, what chance your data could be raided and analysed?
All these points serve to remind us that the cloud does not exist. What does exist are a series of buildings, housing servers, that happen to have Internet connections. There’s a huge difference.
Stolen RSA data used to hack defense contractor • The Register
There’s a lot more analysis out there today on the Lockhead Martin hack that has led to a recall of RSA SecurID tokens. Anyone using them should demand replacements, or, as a better option alternatives. As the article notes, it’s difficult to trust RSA now…
It’s interesting how the use of a single security product has contributed so severely to a breach. The defence in depth seems to have completely failed. Perhaps this is a case of putting too much faith into a single product – almost along the lines of “we’re safe; we have a firewall”.
A significant point here is how organisations are entwined so that breaches for one company can have serious implications for others – we tend to see this more with business partners (extranet services, VPNs etc.) where choices are made to allow third-party access to data, but this blurs the distinction; the security providers should be treated as business partners.
Many large companies have clauses in contracts providing the right to audit and test partner facilities – this can include running pen tests, or insisting that a validated third party does so – in essence the security domain is extended to include the wider community. With the trends we’re seeing in security as the industry reacts to changing business practices I believe the auditing of external organisations will become more prevalent.
This could be a watershed for how companies treat their security providers as well as their business partners. For those on the other side I can also see a competitive advantage in security – something that I hope will become relevant, especially in “cloud” based services.